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Complexity theory has emerged as a relatively new line of research to study the 
evolutionary behavior of the firm.  Recent articles (Leifer, 1989; Stacey, 1995; 
MacIntosh and Maclean, 1999) follow the foundation work of Prigogine and Stengers’ 
(1984) theory of how physical objects behave at the edge of chaos.  This theory provides 
a framework for analyzing firm behavior where disequilibrium and entropy are the norms 
and firms attempt to navigate in highly dynamic and nonlinear business environments
2. 
The literature to date has served to integrate the physical theories with managerial 
and organizational applications.  The goal of these theoretical exercises is to understand 
change which is radical, all-encompassing and rapid (MacIntosh and Maclean, 1999).  In 
dynamic and non linear environments firms are challenged by two competing strategies;  
exploiting their own bureaucracies to address the short run and operational  while 
harnessing the power of informal networks and self reorganization properties for 
addressing acute uncertainties and the long run (Stacey, 1995).   
Consistent with Austrian economics (Schumpeter, 1934) the edge of chaos is 
necessary for economic growth by inciting creativity and innovation.  Feedback is both 
positive and negative in an environment of disorder.  This creates new patterns, order, 
direction, and correspondingly innovation.  Complexity theory, applied to organizational 
behavior, serves as a foundation for theorists to depart from the Newtonian paradigm of 
underlying system equilibrium and move to an alternative where disequilibrium is the 
                                                 
2 See Levy (1994) as well who writes about managerial applications of chaos theory.    2
norm.  This places the organization continually at odds with its environment (Leifer, 
1989).  Any stability is assumed to be short-lived at best.  This paradigm is especially 
appealing to better understand knowledge-based economies where, diseconomies are 
common, informal networks are highly valuable, and end-user preferences are significant, 
dynamic, and highly non linear. Taken to its most extreme, planning is futile as even 
small events create unexpected outcomes (Levy, 1994; Stacey, 1995).   
While the literature has focused on and developed theory about existence in an 
environment of acute flux, little work has been done about the dimensions of the edge of 
chaos.  How do firms know the difference between short-term turbulence and structural 
change?  What about the edge of the edge of chaos?  What firm level properties and 
processes lead to innovation and rejuvenation? In application this is a significant 
challenge for managers and organizations.    
Similarly, are only far-from-equilibrium states recognized ex-post?  While the 
literature emphasises environmental hostility and a lack of fitness as important 
characteristics of operating far-from-equilibrium, are there dimensions other than 
hostility that affect organizational behavior as firms operate in unstable environments? 
The complexity literature appears to assume that the environment at the bifurcation point 
is clearly understood.  Somehow drawing from the behavior of physical systems we can 
impute what the edge of chaos is like.  We disagree. In this manuscript we extend the 
complexity model of the firm by drawing on the literature of organizations and their 
environment.  Specifically we attempt to accomplish four objectives: 1) develop the 
notion of environmental munificence more explicitly; 2) differentiate munificence from 
hostility where hostility is decidedly temporal and munificence is not; 3) model   3
munificence as a dampening as well as nurturing force; 4) empirically operationalize this 
more complex view of the decent towards chaos.    
Firms do not entirely manage their environments nor are they entirely managed by 
their environments.  This debate has been ongoing as organizational theorists attempt to 
sort out firm-level capabilities, i.e. contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Carroll, 1988) from population level forces (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  It is not well 
understood which force trumps in the evolutionary process.  Generally speaking as 
environments become increasingly more unpredictable generalist firms (R-types) have 
the highest probability of survival because of their adaptability and low bureaucracy 
costs.  Specialist firms (K-types) with fixed capital and an efficiency orientation are 
preferred in stable environments (Zammuto, 1988).  The behavior of these archetypes 
becomes quite interesting when they are removed from their static niche environments 
and forced to compete for survival in a more realistic dynamic and complex world (Ng 
and Goldsmith, 1998).   
The organizational behavior literature dealing with dynamic environments 
demonstrates an important element missing from the current complexity theory literature.  
The business environment is not simply life at the edge of chaos or among perpetual 
trigger events (Leifer, 1989), but a dynamic process, of varying degrees of ill-fitness.  
Brown and Eisenhardt (2001) describe a continual change process while others (Tushman 
and Romanelli, 1985; Anderson and Tushman, 2001) describe the notion of punctuated 
equilibrium.  This dynamic process involves both convergence (incremental behavior) 
and reorientation (discontinuous changes in strategy).     4
Munificence has traditionally been viewed as a bounty from which firm fitness 
and survival are enhanced (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975; Mintzberg, 1979; Dess and 
Beard, 1984; Anderson and Tushman, 2001).  The notion being that the more resources 
available to firms the greater their ability to grow and thrive. Dess and Beard’s (1984) 
seminal work, and the extensions that followed (Castrogiovanni, 1991; Rasheed and 
Prescott, 1992, Anderson and Tushman, 2001) empirically link munificence, complexity 
and dynamics in the environment with firm response.   
The over-abstractions involved in the Dess and Beard taxonomy were addressed 
by Castrogiovanni (1991).  He offers a structured framework by which researchers can 
invoke greater precision in their analysis and discussion of business behavior and the 
environment.    The Castrogiovanni taxonomy involves five categories that pertain to 
specific levels of analysis representing the environmental system of the firm: the macro 
environment; the aggregation environment; the task environment; the sub-environment, 
and the resource pool (Figure 1).  That is if we want to understand what drives a firm’s 
fitness, munificence, complexity, and dynamic properties need to be understood at these 
five levels.  By adding greater rigor to the Dess and Beard framework, Castrogiovanni 
directs researchers to correct for over simplification and is a lesson students of 
complexity theory can apply to their models.  
The Dess and Beard concept of munificence becomes more complex with analysis 
across the various levels.  The taxonomy highlights opportunities for substitution and 
cross utilization of resources and heterogeneous issues of competition (inter-firm, inter-
industry, and intra-industry) (Castrogiovanni, 1991).  This appears consistent with the 
notion of epistasis where landscape ruggedness is a positive function of industry   5
complexity and degree of necessary inter-firm linkages (McKelvey, 1999).  If indeed 
environmental munificence contains redundancies, compensating factors, and opposing 
forces across multiple dimensions and multiple levels, then firms at any one time can face 
a very conflicting set of signals about their environment and performance and 
correspondingly are challenged by a conflicting set of alternatives.   
While disequilibrium as the norm and an on-going struggle for fitness make sense 
in this Schumpeterian world of unrelenting competition, firm responses may be varied.  
While the complexity literature has focused on life at the edge of chaos, understanding 
firm behavior in the decent to chaos may be more important for understanding optimum 
firm performance.  In the limit, we would argue that the edge of chaos is a myth, in that it 
is not a discrete state.  In reality it is a continuum whereby the complexity described by 
Castrogiovanni makes numerous types of firm-level responses possible at any time, 
whether they be punctuated, continuous, or radical.  For example, even when managers 
think they are at the edge of chaos they may still have internal resources at their disposal 
or rates of change may not in fact be relatively acute.   At any point in time comparable 
firms within an industry may be driven to exit, to innovate at the margin (short jumping), 
innovate at the architectural level (long jumping), or diversify outside of their immediate 
industry (cross jumping).  
Part of the confusion about the decent towards bifurcation is that authors have 
been unclear about the time dimension relevant to the firm’s response.  That is, when 
does environmental deterioration become “hostile?”  Khandwalla (1973) and Mintzberg 
(1979) defined hostility as the opposite of munificence without a time dimension.  The 
complexity literature, though describing the state of the edge of chaos well, leaves the   6
temporal nature untouched.  Other authors have been less explicit about the difference 
between hostility and munificence but more explicit about the temporal dimension of 
munificence: less than one year decline/growth (Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989); annual 
decline/growth (Dess and Beard, 1984; Rasheed and Prescott, 1992; Anderson and 
Tushman, 2001); a two year decline/growth (Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989; a five year 
decline/growth (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975).  
While certain environmental effects do vary over time, stable environmental 
features too affect firm strategy and the evolutionary path.  For example, one can 
certainly imagine certain regions of the country more conducive to innovation than 
others.  The bounty of available resources might not be temporal but a structural feature 
of the location, e.g. the human resources associated with Silicon Valley.  Alternatively 
temporal flows of available resources too affect organizational response.  To account for 
differing dynamic properties in the environment we extend the Castrogiovanni taxonomy 
to include temporal dimensions at each level.   
Using this extension, munificence might better represent the more static structural 
environmental features, and hostility the first derivative of the temporal environment.  
Thus at any one time the environment could be hostile and munificent.  For example, 
over the short run (i.e. two years) performance at the task level is poor, but the resource 
pool may be deep enough to allow the firm to weather the turbulence with only moderate 
adaptation.  In foresight is a firm myopic or patient?  Ex-post, environmental 
munificence’s muting of hostile signals may have been to the long run detriment of the 
firm.  Under such complexities, the edge of chaos becomes much less definable or, in 
practicality, unknowable.     7
  Also unclear are the signs of the forces emerging from the environment.  Des & 
Beard, (1984) proposed that high munificence may allow for the accumulation of slack, 
in the context of that used by Cyert & March, (1963), which can provide a buffer in times 
of relative scarcity.  We can imagine this buffer limiting adaptive behavior.  The 
complexity literature, drawing from theories of thermodynamics, posits that greater 
innovative activity is correlated with declining levels of munificence.  The edge of chaos 
is a space of frenetic search and energy importation (dissipation). 
Alternatively, Yasai-Ardekani, (1989) finds that high munificence environments 
result in decentralization of decision making, and a general opening of the organizational 
structure to permit an effective and timely response to environmental demands.  That is, 
munificence at the task and sub-environment levels results in the ability to fluidly (and 
radically) respond to environmental context.  In low munificence environments on the 
other hand, pressures stimulate procedure formalization and centralization of decision-
making in want of greater control and efficiencies, (Yasai-Ardekani, 1989).  This would 
restrict innovative activity and limit organizational adaptation to incrementalism.   This is 
consistent with Kahnwallas (1973) finding that scarcity of resources leads to avoidance of 
excessive risk taking by firms, and greater attention to conservation of resources.  The 
finance literature also supports this notion of decreasing risk aversion with increasing 
wealth (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Blake, 1996). 
Still the notion of a direct mapping between environment and risk taking may not 
be entirely uniform (Ng and Goldsmith, 1998).  In immature environments, R-type 
generalist firms dominate because of their flexible architectures.  Current wealth and 
option values are low, and failure relatively painless (Ng and Goldsmith, 1998).  These   8
are the most dynamic environments in terms of innovation.  The risk taking is driven by 
the allure of first-mover-benefits, future wealth, and relatively little downside risk.  
Alternatively, in very mature environments where competition wanes, K-type specialists 
dominate.  But eventually wealth declines as markets shift and assets become 
cumbersome to redeploy.  In such an advanced state the firm struggles in its search for 
fitness hesitating to radically reconfigure (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  In such hostile 
environment short-term down-side risk of reorientation is high and, though not globally 
optimal, incrementalism may be preferred. 
Therefore wealth may at times serve as an inertial force inhibiting risk taking and 
architectural innovation or a liberating force providing the necessary resources for 
exploration.   Therefore the expected direction of the effects on the firm from 
munificence and hostility may be unclear or contradictory when trying to empirically 
analyze firm behavior vis-à-vis their environment.  Munificence and hostility can be 
either pulling or pushing forces as the firm interacts with its multi-layered environment.  
The lack of precision that authors (Castrogiovanni, 1991; McArthur & Nystrom, 1991) 
have been concerned with is due to the contradictory forces driving firm-level innovation 
and the continuum of response alternatives available to the firm.   
Empirical Setting 
Because of these complexities more grounded empirical work is needed to better 
understand the behavior of firms as they operate in declining environments.  The 
following empirical exercise explores adaptive responses on the decent towards 
bifurcation.  The models has two overall objectives; to provide insight into the   9
differences between hostility and munificence, and second by empiricizing 
Castrogiovanni’s taxonomy, provide a greater understanding of the firm’s decent.  
To do this US agriculture, specifically crop production, serves as the empirical 
setting to explore the above theory.  Reports of severe economic hardship at the farm 
level of the US agriculture industry are familiar; “farmers are hurting right now”
3 
(Washington Post, 2002). The agricultural business environment continues to change as 
the industry shifts from a commodity paradigm with isolated organizations to one 
involving greater product and service differentiation with greater interconnectedness.  
Biotechnologies, industrial concentration, shifts in power distribution within the supply 
chain, and incessantly changing consumer demands, are just a few examples of the forces 
effecting change (Goldsmith and Gow, 2001).  Meanwhile, it appears farm performance 
continues to decline.  Over recent years there has been a continuous flow of reports about 
the economic stress in farm communities:  “US Farms Under Considerable Stress, Study 
Shows” (AgNews, 1999); “Gloom and Doom, Ideas From Washington” was the title of  a 
conference discussing ideas for improving the “well being of struggling US farmers” 
(Successful Farming, 1999).  The theme for the National Corn Growers 1999 convention 
was "Call for Survival: a Rally to Address the Crisis in Agriculture."  The association 
even made the registration fee voluntary in recognition of the “severe financial hardships 
facing many producers.”  
The average return on assets for US agricultural enterprises at the producer level 
was 21 percent lower during the 1990-2000 decade than throughout 1960-1970 (ERS, 
2000a, b).  Further, relative farm income (Figure 2) has decreased at an average rate of 4 
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percent per year over the last decade (ERS, 2000a; BEA, 2001).  Nominal crop prices 
have been static, if not declining, while the volatility of prices remains high.  For 
example, the average nominal price of a weighted basket of corn, soybean, and wheat has 
declined at an average rate of 1 percent per year over the last 10 years (NASS, 2001), 
while price volatility on a year-to-year basis ranges between 10-15 percent (NASS, 
2001).  Using Illinois crop farmers as an example, every year over the 5 year period 
1996-2000, farmers experienced an average loss of $19,300 on corn and soy production 
alone (FBFM, 2001).  This is equivalent to a 1.5 billion dollar loss for the state, and if 
extrapolated, a loss of $ 4.7 billion each year for the nation.  Not only have losses been 
incurred over recent years, but they have increasing as well. Over the last 20 years, losses 
have risen at an average rate of 8 percent per year.   
The ability for crop farmers to sustain these substantial losses is partly attributable 
to increasing government support. Over the last 20 years, government payments to the 
agricultural industry have increased at an average rate of $520 million per year (ERS, 
2001a).  In 2000 alone, government payments to the agricultural industry amounted to a 
total of $23 billion (ERS, 2001a).  Further, the 2002 Farm Bill, at $180 billion, more than 
doubles the support to agriculture (Elliott, 2002). The need for these transfers indicates a 
fundamental structural problem of fitness at the farm level.   
The objective of the empirical analysis is to explore how farmers are responding 
to this apparent hostile environment.  To analyze farmers’ adaptive practices a cross-
sectional time series representing crop production (corn, soybeans and wheat) in nine US 
Midwestern states
4 from 1963 – 1999 is employed (Table 1).  Agriculture being a 
competitive industry, allows for relatively high degrees of homogeneity compared to 
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other industries.  Technology and information technologies are relatively symmetric 
across the industry.  This reduces the immeasurable idiosyncratic effects found in 
traditional cross-sectional series.  In crop production the business form too is relatively 
homogeneous being comprised of small corporations underlayed by family ownership 
and control.   Market prices are exogenous and government payments are allocated by 
crop not be region.  These features not only allow for less “noise” arising from the data, 
but also easier imputation of managerial behavior from industry-level responses.  This 
research studies five adaptive responses (dependent variables); increasing scale, 
increasing specialization, ex-industry diversification, exit and architectural innovation 
(Table 2).   Two regression models, munificence and hostility, are built to analyze in 
forces affecting strategic choice. 
Operational Measures
5 
Incremental change (short jumping) – Romanelli and Tushman (1994) 
operationally define incremental change as small-scale changes of internal power 
distributions and market breadth, across a considerable time period.  Prahalad (1993) 
describes this as addressing the productivity gap; a focus on improving performance 
across existing dimensions of the firm.   Incremental changes are consistent with low risk, 
and reversibility that have little affect on the underlying deep structure of the 
organization.   
Average rate of change of farm size is the first dependent variable analyzed.  It 
reflects reinvestment associated with scale economies; “doing what one does better.”  
The second incremental strategy modeled is the degree of specialization (the percentage 
of farm area used for the production of corn, soy and wheat).  This reflects a strategy of 
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not only increasing efficiency through focus, but also is reflective of environmental risk.  
In crop production, diversification is a strategy to manage risk.  If one crop fails or one 
crop’s price falls, the remainder of the cropping portfolio compensate.  Specialization 
reflects the “absence” of such turbulence.   
Ex-industry diversification (cross jumping) – The third adaptive practiced studied 
is off-farm employment.  Non-farm income is a particularly important source of 
household income for most types of US farms (Offutt, 2000).  Agriculture Census data 
indicates that off-farm employment levels have been increasing at an average rate of 
approximately three percent per year over the last 25 years (NASS, 1999).  Ex-industry 
diversification is measured as the percentage of farmers working more than 200 days off 
farm each year.  It is hypothesized such a choice is motivated by forces different from 
those inducing within-industry incremental change.  That is, an increase in non-business 
diversification could be as motivated by a pulling from the macro level of the 
environment, as a direct push from low munificence at the resource, sub-environment or 
task levels.   
Radical Adaptation (long jumping)-   Such adaptive strategies typically require a 
major reorganization of resources within the firm.  This may involve leveraging core 
competencies and outside resources or simply de-assetation and exit from the industry.  
Industry exit reflects environmental selection against the firm as described by Hannan & 
Freeman, (1977) and Aldrich & Pfeffer, (1976).   In terms of complexity theory, this 
selection is equivalent to the system ‘dying’ after ineffective adaptation at the point of 
bifurcation: failure to correct for the fundamental mismatch of organizational form and 
environmental context (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999).  It is   13
hypothesised that exit will increase with a pulling force from the macro and aggregate 
environment and decrease with the supportive nature of task, sub, and resource 
environments.  The measure of exit (following Anderson & Tushmans’ (2001) 
identification of exit as the termination of production and withdrawal from the industry) 
is derived from statistics tracking the decline in the number of farms within any one state 
(ERS, 1996).   
Alternatively a long jump may entail architectural innovation, similar to 
Prahalad’s (1993) opportunity gap approach.  In agriculture the adoption of relationship 
management (one-to-one marketing) orientation by commodity firms, or the 
establishment of ‘long-jump producer-owned ventures,’ such as new generation 
cooperatives (NGC’s
6) have been identified as a form of long jumping (Goldsmith and 
Gow, 2001).  NGC establishment involves a large investment of resources, commitments 
that are not necessarily reversible, and the acquisition of competencies that are not 
necessarily within the existing set of competencies of the producer.  As investments of 
this type are irrecoverable (irreversible), irrespective of the performance of the venture, 
they can be likened to the complexity concept of entropy where firms import new 
“energy” and ideas as firms approach bifurcation.  The ‘new ideas’, ‘new products’, and 
‘new markets’ discussed by Cobia (1997) in relation to NGC’s correspond to Prahalad’s 
(1993) ‘imaginative configurations’ and requirement for a stretch of aspiration, and 
acquisition of new competencies.  Data about NGC formation in the US since 1970 are 
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used as a proxy for agricultural radical innovation and originate from a data set compiled 





Hostility – Previous theory measures hostility in terms of unexpected 
environmental changes and shocks (Covin & Slevin 1989; McArthur & Nystrom, 1991).  
In many respects, the operational measures adopted here are not unlike measures of 
concepts such as dynamism, malevolence, threat, turbulence, and instability used in 
previous studies.  In a practical sense, the operational measures adopted here are similar 
to Dess and Beard’s (1984) measures of dynamism (stability-instability, turbulence) that 
account for variability in the environment, and uncertainty of this variability.  Dess and 
Beard (1984) found measures such as the variability of sales, margins, employment, and 
value added to be valid means of measuring dynamism.  This practice to capture 
dynamism has since been followed by subsequent research (Shafman & Dean, 1991; 
Rasheed & Prescott, 1992; Goll & Rasheed, 1997).   
The average change over two year periods
i is used to study hostility’s impact on 
organizational adaptation.   The lagged measures capture the degree of short term 
turbulence of the environment.  The independent variables are price, yield, net farm 
income, return on assets, and government payments (Table 3).  Yield change represents 
the general ‘hostility’ of the physical environment (the resource pool level) and captures 
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the  affects of weather patterns, weeds, pests, plant diseases, and other physical, 
biological, and climatic factors effecting the quantity and quality of production.   
Net farm income, and return on assets are two firm-level measures that reflect the 
current favorability (or hostility) of the sub environment.  The two measures are valuable 
to account for costs of production; increases being reflective of sub- environmental 
hostility.   
Crop prices (after appropriately weighting
ii) are widely reported, thus highly 
visible, reflect the task environment in terms of the economic climate and market 
conditions.  Also, consistent with Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976), temporal declines in 
government support are indicative of hostility.  Government support has become a large 
and influential part of the environment itself in that payments to farmers have been 
capitalized into land prices on the basis that they positively contribute to expectations of 
future earnings (ERS, 2001).  Any short term decline in the level of this support is thus 
perceived as an increase in the adversity of the aggregate environment.   
Munificence – Previous studies of environmental munificence have generally 
empiricized munificence in terms of growth in sales (Yasai-Ardekani, 1989; McArthur & 
Nystrom, 1991).  More comprehensive investigations of munificence used a variety of 
measures including; number of employees, value of shipments, firm concentration ration, 
and average market share (Dess & Beard, 1984; Shafman & Dean, 1991).  The 
munificence model used in this study attempts to reflect the ‘state’ of the environment in 
terms of resource abundance or scarcity rather than indirect measures such as “rates of 
growth.”   These measures, made in relative terms (see Figure 3), more accurately reflect 
the ‘state’ nature of resource availability and the time dependent development of   16
perceptions that condition behavior in response to munificence.  Using relative ten year 
averages provides the ability to better capture the way in which the farm managers 
perceive the state of their resources base (Figure 4).  This differentiates the measurement 
of munificence from that of hostility and previous research.   
The most basic level of resources are captured by two variables: quality of the soil 
and weather, reflected in long term yield differences; and firm wealth, reflected in long 
term equity levels.  High quality soils or elevated equity levels as resource pools 
potentially provide opportunity for a wider variety of adaptive strategies.   
Long term trends in return on assets are used to reflect the sub-environment 
associated with firms themselves and their control of the resource pool.  Higher prices, 
like demand growth as measured by Des & Beard (1984) and Shafman & Dean (1991), 
are a significant resource in the regional (task) environment.   Castrogiovanni (1991) 
points to task resources as those affecting the firm and those firms with which it must 
interact. 
The aggregate level is a higher order still reflecting resources available to not only 
the firms but the stakeholder community as well.  Government payments, as noted above, 
have considerable effects on the expectations of crop producers and as such significantly 
influence the decision-making process.  Consistent with the aggregate level, these 
resources are not entirely dedicated.  They can not only reduced but more importantly 
redirected to other sectors and missions of the USDA, i.e. nutrition, conservation, and 
food safety. 
Relative income and munificence of the ex-industry environment reflect the 
attraction/repulsion force of the greater macro environment.  Relative income is the ratio   17
of average net farm income per farm to average per capita income for the state.  An 
adaptive response to low relative income would move resources to higher valued 
opportunities.  Ceteris paribus, under conditions of low relative income a farm-firm 
would be expected to reduce investment in agriculture and either increase investment 
outside of agriculture or even exit.   
Outside opportunities to redeploy capital may be limited at the same time relative 
income is low.  The ex-industry macro environment is proxied by the number of 
metropolitan areas of population greater than 100,000 multiplied by the total number of 
people residing in those areas divided by the crop acres in the state.  The variable serves 
as a proxy for the pool of off-farm or exit opportunities available to farm managers.  At 
the same time, a high level of industrial activity associated with a significant metropolitan 
presence in the state could serve as valuable resource for farm businesses seeking to 
shorten the supply chain and serve end-users more directly through new generation 
cooperatives.   
 
Results 
Final presentation of results was not ready at the time of publication of this version.  
Results and discussion and an updated manuscript will be provided at the seminar.  
Appendices 1 and 2, which are attached, show the regression results.  i
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8 The upper Midwest states are defined as; North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota; the Eastern corn 




















UMW = Upper Midwest (South Dakota, North Dakota, and Minnesota) 
WCB = Western Cornbelt (Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa) 
ECB = Eastern Cornbelt (Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio) 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics by State (Average; 1960-2000) 





                
Land in Farms (000 acres)  29,000  17,000  34,000  49,000  31,000  48,000  41,000  17,000  45,000 
Farm  Size  277  194 276 625  291  724  1053 167  1110 
Specialization
a  85  82 72 50  62  52  38 68  42 
Price  3.34  3.22 3.09 2.83  3.06  2.60  2.94 3.37  2.68 
Yield  75  73 81 40  64  74  30 65  42 
Government Pmt per Acre  13.35  11.55  15.61  8.28  11.62  8.03  7.32  8.62  4.35 
Return  on  Assets  2.43  2.64 3.10 2.35  3.73  3.10  2.05 2.98  3.71 
Equity per Acre  1234  1061  584  376  688  715  290  1078  233 
Debt/Equity    16  21 25 23  26  26  20 16  24 
State  Population  11496000  5515000 2848000 2421000  4216000  1576000  646000  10866000  698000 
Relative  Income  0.88  0.69 1.11 0.73  0.89  1.16  0.81 0.60  1.36 
Off-farm  Employment  38  20 26 26  21  16  12 39  14 
Exit  Rate  1.80  1.85 1.65 1.37  1.70  1.32  1.55 1.60  1.50 
     
a % of total acres used in the production of corn, soy, and wheat.   xi
Table 2 – Strategic Response Variables 
# Response  Operational  Calculation
  Data Source 
      
1  Size   Average farm size  NASS, (2001) 
3 Specialization




The percentage of producers working less than 200 days per year off farm)  USCB, (1990) 
4  Exit   Average rate of farm number decline (%) from one year to the next.  NASS, (2001) 
5 Innovation
  Number of new generation cooperative organizations (NGC’s) formed per acre of 
cropland 
Merritt et al, (1999) and 
Merritt, (2002) 
All data are for the period from 1963-1999   xii
Table 3 – Explanatory Variables
a (all models) 
No.  Characteristic                                                           Operational Calculation  Data Source 
      
1  Price  Average weighted price/bushel of a basket corn/soy/wheat   NASS, (2001) 
2  Price Volatility  Longitudinal standard deviation of price for each subject  NASS, (2001) 
3  Soil Quality  Average weighted yield (bushels) of a basket of corn, soy, and wheat, per acre of 
cropland 
NASS, (2001) 
4  Weather  Longitudinal standard deviation of yield for each subject  NASS, (2001) 
5  Net Farm Income  Average farm income (excluding direct government transfers) per acre of farmland
b ERS,  (2000a) 
6  Return on Assets  Net farm income/total value of farm assets  ERS, (2000a), ERS, 
(2000b) 
7  Government Payments  Total direct government transfers per acre of total cropland   ERS, (2000a), 
8  Metropolitan Areas  Number of metropolitan areas (of population greater than 100,000) multiplied by the cumulative 
population of those metropolitan areas, on a per acre of farmland basis
 
Lagmeyer, (2002),  
NASS, (2001)  
9  Relative Income  Net farm income divided by per capita income  ERS, (2001a), BEA, 
(2001) 
10  Equity
  Average equity value per acre of total farmland (net worth/acre)   ERS, (2001b), 
      
aRelevant munificence measures are expressed in terms of relative averages. 
Relevant hostility measures are calculated on an average 2-year difference value. 
b This net farm income measure does not allow for a return to management. 
 
   xiii
Table 4 – Summary Statistics for Munificence Variables 
 MUNIFICENCE             
    Std.dev.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
               
1  Price 0.22           
2  Price Variability  0.10  - 0 . 8 6 *        
3  Yield 15.82  0.37*     -0.08        
4  Yield Variability  2.54  0.11* -0.27* -0.64*      
5 
Return on Assets  0.73     0.05 
    
0.00  0.24*     -0.02      
6  Government Payments  1.81  0.52* -0.30* 0.69*  -0.30*    0.08       
7  Metropolitan Areas  0.33  0.61* -0.42* 0.32*   0.04    -0.10     0.09     
8  Relative Income  0.28  -0.42* 0.23*   -0.07    -0.07  0.48* -0.13*  -0.63*  
9  Equity 236.98  0.69* -0.43* 0.72* -0.46*   -0.06 0.49* 0.63* -0.42*
              
Mean VIF = 5.0 (Maximum VIF = 11.8) 




Table 5 – Summary Statistics for Hostility Variables
a 
 Variable  Mean  Std.    Dev
b. 1 234
              
1 Price  0.04 11.64       
2 Yield  0.95 6.25 -0.56 
3 Net Farm Income  -0.08 -155.70 0.08* 0.42
4 Return on Assets  -0.11 5.62 0.23 0.34 0.75
5 Government   0.81 -10.89 -0.09* -0.17 -0.60 -0.37
             
a These are mean difference values (i.e. they represent the average annual change over the 36-year period) 
b This measure of variance has been standardized for the mean value of the variable. 
Mean VIF = 2.44 (Maximum = 3.4) 
Condition Index for model = 3.6 
*p<.05   xiv
 
Appendix 1 – Temporal Model Results 
HOSTILITY  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  NGC  Size   Specialization  Off Farm  Exit 
       
Price   0.01  -0.42   0.18  -1.36  -0.41 
  (0.09) (1.68) (1.40) (3.10)**  (1.62) 
       
Yield  -0.01 -0.01   0.01   0.04 -0.01 
  (0.88) (0.65) (0.47) (1.25) (0.53) 
       
Net farm income   0.00   0.01   0.01   0.04   0.01 
 (0.14)  (0.59)  (2.02)* (1.98)* (0.39) 
       
Return on assets   0.01  -0.22 -0.22 -0.96 -0.22 
 (0.18)  (1.97) (3.81)**  (4.91)**  (1.96) 
       
Government Payments   0.02  -0.06 -0.03  0.06  -0.06 
 (1.23)  (2.54)* (2.41)* (1.43)  (2.50)* 
  
R-squared  0.01 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.06 
       
Those numbers in parenthesis represent the absolute value of the t statistics  
** Significant at 1%   xv
Appendix 2 – “State” Results 
MUNIFICENCE    NGC Size  Specialization  Off  Farm  Exit 
Price     0.13 -451.07 35.14 -1.59 0.09
    (1.65) (7.24)** (7.62)** (0.38) (0.48)
      
Price Variability     0.10 -363.99 46.03  8.27 0.21
    (0.94) (4.28)** (7.31)** (1.46) (0.87)
      
Yield   -2.E-03 -11.55 0.65   0.06 2.E-03
    (2.36) (20.35)** (15.49)** (1.67) (1.25)
      
Yield Variability   -3.E-03 -14.09 2.15   0.65 0.01
    (0.99) (5.91)** (12.17)** (4.06)** (1.82)
      
Return on Assets     0.06 -100.83 -1.75  2.39 0.04
    (6.96)** (15.55)** (3.64)** (5.54)** (2.24)
      
Government Payments     0.01 -21.14 0.05  0.47 0.02
    (2.43) (5.46)** (0.17) (1.81) (2.15)
      
Metropolitan Areas    -0.09 66.53 -8.08  11.41 0.16
    (3.66)** (3.33)** (5.47)** (8.58)** (2.83)**
      
Relative Income    -0.12 514.97 -0.44 -16.44 -0.02
    (4.89)** (25.42)** (0.29) (12.19)** (0.30)
      
Equity   -1.E-04 -0.04 0.03   0.01 0.03
    (2.17) (0.92) (9.12)** (3.73)** (1.15)
    
R-squared   0.32  0.96 0.92 0.83 0.35
         
Those numbers in parenthesis represent the absolute value of the t statistics  
**   Significant at 1%   xvi
Endnotes 
                                                 
i The two-year lagged period is adopted only after having first found that the one and three year lagged 
periods were less desirable predictors of strategic response (that is, after having modeled them against the 
dependent variables).  Also, the measures are deliberately not detrended on the basis that the holistic impact 
of both variability and trend (cumulative for the various response variables) is an important component of 
the model as determinants of strategic change.  Had the study focused on a more micro-analysis of 
organizational adaptation (e.g. one specific strategic response), then detrending would be an appropriate if 
not necessary part of the analytical process.  Future research efforts may attempt to distinguish between the 
specific influence of the trend and the year to year variability.  Though it is recognized that both affect 
strategic response, for the sake of comprehensiveness and parsimony, the effects are not separately 
analyzed in this investigation.   
ii Yield is weighted for the proportion of crop type grown.  Careful consideration was given to the 
weighting scheme used (alternatives included weighting relative to the average yield for the population, and 
no weighting at all).  It was found that there is little variation between these indexes (analysis of pair-wise 
correlation coefficients showed that all relationships were significant at the 0.0001 level), such that 
potential effects (of differing alternative weighting schemes) on model results are minimal.  Thus, a 
weighting scheme by crop area was selected for its ability to more accurately reflect changes observed at 
the farm level.  This was made on the assumption that firstly, deviation of percentage yield variability 
across the three major crops is minimal, and secondly farmers are more perceptive to the variability in their 
own yields than they are to those of neighboring farms, or state or population averages.  The same rationale 
is made for the weighting of price.  Again it was found that alternative schemes produce indexes of very 
high covariance and thus have minimal effect on regression results (this is likely attributable to the high 
degree of competition both within and between markets for crop products and the relatively high degree of 
substitutability of crop products (especially in feed markets) in the case of price, and similar effects of 
rainfall, sunshine hours etc. on all crop types produced in relation to yields).  The degree to which risk is 
endogenized or exogenized by this means of indexing yield and price for the three crop products is an 
interesting topic for further research.   